HMR Has the Same Squeeze DNA as GameStop - But With a Business That Actually Works (fyi i love how Cohen is running it now - Increasing Book Value & Cash)

Let me take you back to late 2020. GameStop was a dying mall retailer. Revenue declining. Short sellers had stacked 140% of the public float in short positions. The company had roughly 69.75 million shares in the float, with only about 23 million actively traded. Market cap sat somewhere around $1.3–2 billion. Shorts were piling in because on the surface, GME looked terminal.

Then it went to $483 intraday.

I've spent time deep in the data on HMR - **Heidmar Maritime Holdings** \- and I'm not here to say this is the next GME because the memes will fly. I'm saying the **structural mechanics** are nearly identical - and HMR has something GME never had: a fundamentally strong, growing, profitable underlying business.

Let's run the comparison side by side.

# The Structural Comparison: GME Pre-Squeeze vs HMR Today

# Where HMR Actually Beats the GME Setup

GME had the float mechanics. What it didn't have was a business improving in real time.

GameStop's fiscal 2020 revenue came in at $5.09 billion - but that was a number *declining year over year*. The short sellers weren't entirely wrong about the fundamentals. The squeeze worked despite a weakening business, driven entirely by float mechanics and social media coordination.

**HMR is the opposite.** The float mechanics are here AND the business is accelerating:

* **373% year-over-year revenue growth** \- not projected, already booked and auditable * **76% revenue growth forecast for 2026** \- compounding on top of a large base * **55%+ gross margins** \- this is software-company territory hidden inside a shipping ticker * **$13.2M operating cash flow** \- the GAAP net loss is noise from one-off IPO costs and non-cash stock comp; the underlying engine is profitable * Cash NEARLY a Majority of MCAP! - Like where GME is now 😄 * **Zero dilutive equity raises since listing** unlike most microcaps that fund growth by printing shares

When GME squeezed, shorts eventually covered because they had no choice. The float was trapped. The business gave them no fundamental reason to reverse course on the squeeze - it resolved purely on mechanical pressure.

With HMR, the fundamental case *reinforces* the mechanical case. As earnings grow, the re-rating pressure compounds on top of the float squeeze potential.

# The Float: HMR Is Tighter Than GME Ever Was

GME pre-squeeze had a float of \~69.75 million shares with \~23 million actively traded. HMR has a float **under 6 million shares** with 90%+ locked by insiders who are not lending.

The GME squeeze happened with a float nearly **12x larger**.

Short sellers need to borrow before they short. With 90%+ of HMR locked by strategic holders who won't lend, there is almost no inventory available. The CEO himself has said: *"The only thing I'm worried about is if I keep buying, there will be no float left."*

GME shorts had 140% of the float sold short - creating the nuclear-level short squeeze pressure. HMR's short interest sits at 0.26% - meaning the squeeze hasn't even started. It also means there's no systematic short base propping up a bear thesis. The stock is purely supply-constrained.

Any meaningful institutional or retail demand hits a float of under 6 million shares with nowhere to go.

# The Insider Signal: The Opposite of GME

One of the most overlooked parts of the GME story is what insiders were actually doing during the squeeze. GameStop board members and executives were *selling* \- Chair Kathy Vrabeck and director Raul Fernandez sold shares from January 13 to 16. When outsiders were loading up, insiders were cashing out.

HMR is structurally different. CEO Pankaj Khanna owns **45% of the company personally** and has been **buying shares above market price for three consecutive months straight - zero sales**. Combined with strategic holders, 90%+ of shares are locked.

This isn't a meme narrative. The person with the most information about this business is the one accumulating the most aggressively. That's a signal GME never had.

# The Business: Fee Platform, Not Boat Operator

The most common mistake in valuing HMR is the comp set. Every metric that applies to IMPP, STNG or FRO - NAV, Price-to-Book, vessel utilization - is irrelevant here.

HMR **owns zero ships**. It is an asset-light fee platform that earns 1.75% of gross voyage revenue - whether rates are $50k/day or $500k/day. One VLCC voyage at today's rates generates \~$350,000+ in commission. It gets paid on volume, not on ownership.

The correct comp is a software/services platform re-rating on earnings growth. And on that basis - 4x forward PE vs 15-20x for peers, market cap below annual revenue - it is one of the most mispriced securities on NASDAQ.

GME at $17 before the squeeze was mispriced by the market. HMR at $1.14 is mispriced by the market. The difference is HMR is mispriced upward in fundamentals while GME was mispriced downward.

# The Macro Tailwind GME Never Had

GME's squeeze was endogenous - it was purely about the float, the social coordination, and short covering pressure. There was no external macro catalyst making GameStop's revenue grow faster.

HMR is **positively asymmetric to global volatility**:

* Strait of Hormuz escalation directly expands HMR's fee base - unlike vessel owners facing insurance blowback * A VLCC was already fixed at nearly $500,000/day - the rate environment is live, not forecast * CEO on record: "Beginning, not the end" of the tanker cycle - with 18–24 months of upside stated explicitly * 9–12 month restocking window creating a 10–20% jump in tanker demand * **5 additional crude tankers just added** to commercially managed fleet (1× 2026 eco-design Suezmax, 2× Suezmax, 1× VLCC, 1× MR1) - more ships in a strong rate environment at zero balance sheet cost

Every geopolitical disruption that terrifies vessel owners is a **revenue expansion event** for Heidmar.

# The Credibility Foundation GME Lacked

GameStop was a dying mall retailer. That was the entire bear thesis, and it wasn't entirely wrong.

HMR has a **40-year operating history**. Clients include Shell, BP, Chevron, Vitol, Saudi Aramco, Trafigura, and Glencore. The largest energy traders on earth run cargo through Heidmar. That's not a story. That's a 40-year track record of institutional trust that cannot be manufactured.

The moat is deepened by **eFleetWatch** \- a proprietary tech platform built over 20 years with real-time voyage data, tracking and performance analytics across every vessel and route. A competitor cannot replicate this in 12 months.

# The Setup in One Line

GME: Dying business + crowded short + tiny float = mechanical squeeze.

HMR: **Accelerating business** \+ near-zero short interest (structurally unborrowable float) + tighter float than GME ever had + CEO buying hard + macro tailwind + zero debt + 55% gross margins + analyst targets 3-6x above current price.

GME squeezed despite its fundamentals. HMR has everything GME had mechanically - and everything GME didn't have fundamentally.

The question isn't whether the setup exists. The question is when awareness arrives.

*Not financial advice. All data sourced from public filings, Their YouTube Channel, SEC disclosures, and company statements. Do your own due diligence.*

HMR Has the Same Squeeze DNA as GameStop - But With a Business That Actually Works (fyi i love how Cohen is running it now - Increasing Book Value & Cash)

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