Key insights
- The article criticizes Cameco's financial decisions under Grant Isaac, specifically the US$430 million acquisition of the undeveloped Yeelirrie uranium project and the C$450 million sale of its stake in Bruce Power. The author argues that the Yeelirrie investment has yielded no returns for years, while the sale of Bruce Power divested an income-generating asset that has since generated significantly more in earnings than its sale price. This is presented as poor capital allocation and a failure to deliver shareholder value.
At what point do we stop grading Grant Isaac on his presentations and start grading him on what Cameco actually did with shareholders’ money?
Because looking at the record, I think he should have stayed in academia.
First, he spent US$430 million on a project that goes nowhere for years.
Cameco bought Yeelirrie in December 2012. Almost fourteen years later, it remains undeveloped, with no work planned in 2026.
Great. Hundreds of millions committed, years of waiting, and still no producing mine. The deposit has value, but shareholders don’t get paid in presentations about potential.
Then sells a Blue Chip Crown Jewel investment that actually produces income.
In 2014, Cameco sold its 31.6% interest in Bruce Power L.P. and related entities for C$450 million to focus on uranium.
Management liked the long-term uranium outlook. Uranium then fell to around US$18 a pound in 2016.
Buy the asset that needs a better market. Sell the asset already generating income. Watch the market get worse.
Some timing.
The Bruce napkin math makes it even harder to swallow.
TC Energy reported C$767 million in earnings from its 48.3% Bruce Power interest in 2025.
Scale that to Cameco’s former 31.6% ownership:
C767million×31.6÷48.3=roughly C502 million in annual earnings.
More than the C$450 million Cameco received for selling its stake.
Now compare that with Cameco’s entire company:
|Year|Net profit / loss| |:-|:-| || |2021|–C$103 million| |2022|C$89 million| |2023|C$361 million| |2024|C$172 million| |2025|C$590 million| |Five-year total|C$1.109 billion| |Annual average|C$222 million|
The rough Bruce Power estimate comes to C$502 million for a single year, while Cameco’s entire business averaged just C$222 million in annual net profit over those five years.
It’s an illustrative comparison: Cameco owned an interest in Bruce B, while TC Energy’s current investment covers a different scope, and retaining it would have required further capital. But those differences don’t make the opportunity-cost question disappear.
Looking at what Bruce earns today, that C$450 million exit feels like selling a blue-chip nuclear investment for pennies on the dollar.
What exactly did shareholders get in exchange?
Then there’s NUKEM.
Cameco acquired the uranium trader in January 2013 for roughly US$148 million in cash consideration.
By 2017, just 4 years later the ENTIRE remaining C$111 million goodwill balance was written off while marketing operations were consolidated.
That isn’t the whole purchase price disappearing. But buying a business and then writing off all its remaining goodwill while cutting back its operations is hardly something I’d put on a capital allocation highlight reel.
And this one has a direct connection to Isaac’s responsibilities. On the call discussing the restructuring, Gitzel referred to Isaac and his marketing and sales team while explaining that Cameco couldn’t afford all that infrastructure.
Another investment, another disappointing outcome, another explanation.
Now we get the contracting masterclass.
In the latest quarter, uranium spot was around US$90 per pound, yet Cameco realized just US$65.78 per pound. That’s roughly 27% below spot. After all the talk about disciplined contracting, the company still posted a C$2 million adjusted net loss.
To me, they gave away too much upside through earlier contracts. I understand protecting the downside, but shareholders bought uranium exposure, and a substantial part of the higher market price isn’t reaching them. The uranium business itself remained profitable, so I’m not saying they were selling at a loss. I’m saying the trade-off looks poor.
Isaac gets credit for understanding how tight this market is. So why does the contract book leave shareholders collecting prices so far below spot? If this is the benefit of his financial discipline, I’m underwhelmed. If Uranium keeps surging to the $125-$150 levels, and they keep having production issues and cost inflation then it doesn’t leave too much upside.
The contracts protect you until they limit you. The undeveloped assets are future opportunities. The disappointing acquisitions become restructuring decisions. Somehow, whatever happens, the explanation is always discipline.
Here’s the record I’m looking at:
- US$430 million for Yeelirrie: almost fourteen years later, still undeveloped. * C$450 million out of Bruce Power: give up a World-class income-producing investment to concentrate on uranium. * The recovery timing misjudged: bullish long-term positioning followed by uranium falling to around US$18. * NUKEM: acquisition, full remaining goodwill write-off, marketing consolidation. * Today’s contracts: US$65.78 realized with spot around US$90, while the company posts a quarterly adjusted loss.
Isaac didn’t make these decisions alone. But he was CFO through the acquisitions and Bruce sale, and commercial and financial strategy remain within his responsibilities.
He can’t be the financial mastermind when people like the story and just another passenger when the decisions age badly.
Cameco owns valuable assets. That doesn’t make the guy overseeing its financial strategy a genius.
Looking at this record, I see a lot more explaining than exceptional decision-making.